Instruction
SAVEPREVSSP
Pushes a restore token onto the shadow stack that RSTORSSP switched away from, so it can be resumed later; CET.
- Extensions
- Forms
- 1 (1 Legacy)
- Data
- Intel XED v2026.08.23
SAVEPREVSSP finishes a switch that RSTORSSP began: it leaves a restore token on the shadow stack the thread has just left, so that a later RSTORSSP can come back to it. It takes no operand. The previous-SSP token that RSTORSSP put on top of the new stack holds the old stack’s SSP, and SAVEPREVSSP takes it from there.
What it writes
- It reads the top entry, which must have bit 1 set, the mark of a previous-SSP token; otherwise #GP(0). SSP itself must be 8-byte aligned, or #GP(0).
- On the old stack it writes 4 zero bytes just below the recorded SSP, and then the restore token, that SSP with bit 0 set for 64-bit mode, in the 8 bytes at the next multiple of 8 below. Where the old SSP was only 4-byte aligned the zeroes fill the gap; in 64-bit code the token covers them.
- It pops the previous-SSP token: SSP grows by 8.
An example with our own numbers: a thread runs on stack A with SSP =
5000H, and stack B has a restore token at 8FF8H holding 9001H. rstorssp [8FF8H] sets SSP to 8FF8H and leaves 5003H there; SAVEPREVSSP then
writes 5001H at 4FF8H on stack A and leaves SSP at 9000H, where B was.
Later, rstorssp [4FF8H] switches back, as the token at 4FF8H passes
the same check, 5000H less 8. Where the thread will not come back,
INCSSPQ with a count of 1 pops the previous-SSP token
instead.
CF links the two
SAVEPREVSSP reads CF as RSTORSSP set it: CF = 1 announces a 4-byte hole above the token, which only 32-bit code leaves, so in 64-bit mode it raises #GP(0). An instruction between the two that sets CF, an ADD or a CMP, makes SAVEPREVSSP fault. AMD’s manual also raises #GP(0) when bit 0 of the token does not match the mode; Intel’s does not test it. SAVEPREVSSP changes no flag.
With -mshstk, GCC 14 and Clang 23 compile _saveprevssp() to the bare
instruction; like the other shadow-stack instructions but RDSSP, it
raises #UD where shadow stacks are off.
AMD’s Zen 5 guide lists SAVEPREVSSP among the shadow-stack instructions Zen 5 supports, as microcoded. The KVM guest that ran the probe reported no shadow stacks in CPUID (leaf 07H, ECX bit 7), and both recorded cases raised #UD.
Forms
| Instruction | Encoding | Requires |
|---|---|---|
SAVEPREVSSP
SAVEPREVSSP | F3 0F 01 EA | CET |
Operation
What the forms do, in pseudocode that our tests run against results recorded on real processors. How to read.
if not cr4 >> 23 & 1: # CR4.CET; clear without CET
fault(UD)
cet = u_cet if CPL == 3 else s_cet
if not cet & 1: # SH_STK_EN: shadow stacks off
fault(UD)
if ssp & 7:
fault(GP, 0)
t = ss_load(ssp, 64) # the previous-SSP token on top
if cf: # RSTORSSP's CF: a hole, which
fault(GP, 0) # 64-bit mode never leaves
if not t & 2: # not a previous-SSP token
fault(GP, 0)
old = t & ~3 # the SSP of the stack left
ss_store(old - 4, 32, 0) # 0 below it, the hole that aligning
# may leave
ss_store((old & ~7) - 8, 64, old | 1)
# a restore token, L = 1, on the
# next 8 bytes down
ssp = ssp + 8 # the token popped
# AMD's manual raises #GP(0) as well where bit 0 of the token, L,
# is not 1 in 64-bit mode; Intel's does not test itRun on AMD Zen 5 (EPYC 9645): 2 cases. Its cases ran where CPUID reported no CET, and every one raised an exception.
Operands
| Operand | Kind | Action |
|---|---|---|
SAVEPREVSSP | ||
SSP | implicit | read |
Flags
None: XED records no flag that the forms test or change.
Attributes
What else XED records about the forms. How to read.
- All forms
- not in real-address mode
Intrinsics
The C intrinsics of Clang 23.1.2 that compile to SAVEPREVSSP, each with the form it compiles to and the Clang options it needs. The forms come from compiling every intrinsic and decoding the result with Intel XED; all intrinsics A–Z explains the method.
| Intrinsic | Compiles to |
|---|---|
_saveprevssp
void _saveprevssp(void) |
|
CPUID and processors
Each form belongs to an XED ISA set. A form can be used when the processor reports every CPUID bit of one of its ISA set's alternatives.
| ISA set | CPUID | Processors |
|---|---|---|
CET | CET | Tiger Lake, Alder Lake, Arrow Lake, Panther Lake, Nova Lake, Sapphire Rapids, Emerald Rapids, Granite Rapids, Diamond Rapids, Sierra Forest, Clearwater Forest, Zen 3, Zen 4, Zen 5, Zen 6 Note: Zen 3 to Zen 6 have the shadow stacks of CET but not its indirect branch tracking, so ENDBR32 and ENDBR64 run on them as hint NOPs. AMD's references for Zen 3, Zen 4 and Zen 5 (55898, 55901, 57238) set CPUID_Fn00000007_ECX_x00[CET_SS] (bit 7) and leave bit 20 of CPUID_Fn00000007_EDX_x00, which Intel gives to indirect branch tracking, reserved and clear. Note: Zen 6 is listed because Zen 5 has these instructions. GCC's -march sets, which give the other features of Zen 6, leave them out, and AMD has not yet published a Processor Programming Reference for Zen 6. |
More CET instructions
Sources
- Intel XED v2026.08.23 (commit
0bcb6237345c): forms, encodings, operands, flags, exception classes, attributes, ISA sets, CPUID bits and chip model. - The CPU data of x86-64.net: Zen 3 to Zen 6, from GCC’s
-marchfeature sets and AMD’s Processor Programming References, which the page of each processor cites. - Clang's x86 intrinsic headers, LLVM 23.1.2 (commit
85ac56026243): the intrinsics, their signatures and doc comments, and the Clang of that release, which compiled each of them. - Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual, Volume 2 (325383-093, September 2026): Volume 2B, page 4-611 (SAVEPREVSSP)
- Linux kernel documentation: Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Shadow Stack
- Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual, Volume 1 (253665-093, September 2026)
- AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual, Volume 3: General-Purpose and System Instructions (24594, rev. 3.36, March 2024), Wayback Machine copy of AMD's PDF
- Software Optimization Guide for the AMD Zen5 Microarchitecture (58455, rev. 1.00, August 2024), Wayback Machine copy of AMD's ZIP
The tables are derived from Intel XED, Copyright Intel Corporation, licensed under the Apache License 2.0; x86-64.net converted and reformatted them. The intrinsics and their signatures come from Clang, part of the LLVM Project, licensed under the Apache License 2.0 with LLVM Exceptions. The text is our own.